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Abstract
Religious terrorism is typically characterised as acts of unrestrained, irrational and indiscriminant violence, 
thus offering few if any policy options for counterterrorism measures. This assumption about religious terrorism 
stems from two challenges in the literature: disproportionate attention to apocalyptic terrorism, and a lack of 
distinction between religious terrorism and its secular counterpart. This article, therefore, aims to do four things: 
define and differentiate religiously motivated terrorism from traditional terrorism; investigate three goals of 
religious terrorism (fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious government, and establishing a religiously pure 
state); consider the role of leadership and target selection of religious terrorists; and, finally, suggest a range of 
counterterrorism strategies based on these observations.
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Introduction
A conventional wisdom has emerged that the current wave of religiously motivated terrorism propagates acts 
of unrestrained, indiscriminant violence, and that it is irrational, thus offering few, if any, policy options for 
counterterrorism measures. Jean-Francois Mayer asserts, for example: “When religious beliefs are used for 
justifying violence, violent actions tend to become endowed with cosmic dimensions, and there is nothing 
left to restrain them.”[1] Similarly, Bruce Hoffman argues: “For the religious terrorist, violence first and 
foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or 
imperative. Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are thereby unconstrained 
by the political, moral, or practical constraints that seem to affect other terrorists.”[2]
These assertions about religion’s role in terrorism stem from two challenges in the literature. First, scholarship 
on religious terrorism tends to focus on one particular motivation—apocalyptic, millennial, or messianic 
terrorism, in which groups use violence to hasten the end of times and usher in an anticipated new world. 
Religious terrorists, however, have other goals, some of which are earthly in their aims; these goals are often 
categorised as political, not religious.[3] Second, religious terrorism has not been clearly distinguished 
from its traditional more secular counterpart with a definition of what makes it unique from other forms of 
terrorism, if it is unique at all.
In order to better understand religiously motivated terrorism, this article will do four things. First it aims to 
define and differentiate religiously motivated terrorism from traditional terrorism, including leftist groups, 
right wing groups, and ethnic-separatist terrorists. Second, it will provide a range of goals for religious groups 
and how terrorism serves these goals. In particular, the article investigates three objectives: fomenting the 
apocalypse, creating a religious government, and establishing a religiously pure state. Third, within these 
goals, the article will consider the role of leadership and target selection of religious terrorists for their 
uniqueness and commonality with traditional terrorism. Finally, the article concludes by offering suggestions 
for mitigating religiously motivated terrorism.
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Defining Traditional and Religious Terrorism
Before distinguishing traditional and religious terrorism from one another, terrorism needs to be defined in 
its own right. There is little consensus on the definition of terrorism, both within academic and policy circles.
[4] Walter Laqueur argues that this lack of consensus is largely due to the fact that there is not one type of 
terrorism and that terrorism, as a tactic, is constantly changing its means, motives and actors.[5] Drawing 
primarily from Bruce Hoffman, this article defines the tactic of terrorism as a) the use or threat of violence; 
b) the targeting of civilians, property, or government; c) the intent of creating fear aimed at altering the status 
quo; and d) a group activity.[6]
This definition stresses that terrorism, first and foremost, is a tactic. As such, non-state and state actors 
can employ terrorist tactics. This article, however, will focus specifically on non-state actors. Second, this 
definition stresses the corporate nature of terrorists and their tactical use of violence with the goal of 
changing the existing political, social, military, or religious order. To be sure, individuals or “lone wolves” 
can employ terrorist tactics to achieve similar goals, but this article will concentrate on groups that use 
terrorism to achieve a stated goal. Finally, this definition is particularly useful for exploring religiously 
motivated terrorism because it considers goals that may not be strictly political, such as changing the social 
and religious order of a state or region. As will be described, religious groups that use terrorism have political 
goals, but they also have social and religious goals that are distinct from political objectives.
Traditional Terrorism: Left, Right and Ethnic-Separatist
Traditional terrorism is typically divided into three sub-categories: left, right and ethnic-separatist.[7] 
Terrorism of the left refers primarily to Anarchist, Marxist and socialist oriented ideologies. This type of 
terrorism was most active in the 20th century, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America and, 
to a lesser extent, the Middle East. Anarchist groups were most popular in Europe around the turn of the 
20th century, particularly in Russia, where movements emerged with the aim of destroying the monarchy and 
the state.[8] Examples of left-wing Marxist groups include the Argentinian Montoneros and ERP, the Italian 
Red Brigades, the German Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader Meinhof group), and the Palestinian 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). All of these groups were inspired by Marxist or socialist 
ideologies.[9] This sub-category of traditional terrorism, although active during the Cold War, has declined 
since the 1980’s.[10] Religious terrorism, by-and-large, has not been associated with this branch of terrorism.
[11]
Right-winged terrorism refers to groups with racist, fascist, or nationalistic motives and goals. This type of 
terrorism was strong between the World Wars and reasserted itself beginning in the 1980’s and continues to 
the present. Early examples include the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, and fascist-inspired movements 
like the Rumanian Iron Guard of the 1930’s.[12] Resurgent right-wing terrorism includes groups like the 
neo-Nazis in Europe and the United States, and violent anti-immigration groups.[13] Religious terrorism 
has often been categorized as a new breed of right-winged terrorism.[14] However, as will be argued below, 
religious terrorism has traits that look like right-winged racism but also contains elements that do not fit into 
this category.
Ethnic-separatist terrorism [15] consists of groups that use terrorism to strive for autonomy or independence 
from a state or military force. Examples of ethnic-separatist terrorists include groups seeking independence 
from an occupying force, such as the Jewish Irgun in Palestine under the British Mandate, the PLO under 
Israeli occupation, and the IRA under British occupation.[16] Another example within this subset is groups 
that seek separation from an existing state such as the ETA in the Basque province of Spain.[17] Academic 
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research also associates religious terrorism with this branch of traditional terrorism.[18] However, it is 
important to distinguish ethnic-separatist terrorists that contain religious elements but whose primary goals 
are non-religious from terrorist groups that have religious goals. An example of a religious-ethnic group 
with non-religious goals is the IRA. Although its constituency is primarily Catholic, the IRA’s aim is to 
expel British forces in the region and reunite Northern Ireland with the Republic, not to create a religious 
government or state. By contrast, an example of a religious/ethnic group with religious goals is the Palestinian 
Hamas, which is pushing for the expulsion of Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the 
creation of an Islamic state in Palestine.[19] Table 1.1 summarizes traditional terrorism.
Table 1. 1 Traditional Terrorism
Defining Goals Examples


















§	Dispel foreign occupying force






Religiously motivated terrorism, although containing elements of all three branches of traditional terrorism, 
needs to be distinguished analytically from traditional terrorism in order to better understand its workings. 
However, similar to discussions on terrorism in general, current literature on religiously motivated terrorism 
lacks consensus on a definition and how it differs from traditional terrorism, if at all. David Tucker even 
argues that the term “religious terrorism” is not of much use because of confusion over its definition.[20] 
Mark Juergensmeyer suggests that religiously motivated terrorism came to the foreground in the 1980s and 
is marked by extreme brutality and seemingly irrational motivations and goals.[21] Bruce Hoffman argues 
that religion serves to uniquely legitimate and justify violence in religious terrorism but does not explain 
how religious ideology differs from Marxist or Fascist ideology in inspiring terrorist acts.[22] Walter Laqueur 
argues that religious terrorism is the “new terrorism of the right” and that it has more to do with nationalism 
than religion. But this definition fails to explain movements like Aum Shinrikyo, who desire to destroy the 
world, not assert their nationalist claims, or Al-Qaeda, which has transnational goals.[23]
Religious terrorism scholar David C. Rapoport offers another argument for what differentiates religious from 
secular terrorism. He posits that the justification and precedents of religious terrorism differ from traditional 
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forms; religious terrorists use sacred texts and historic examples that are not present in secular terrorism. 
Secular terrorism, in contrast, develops a culture of actions and boundaries that restrains the scope of violent 
acts.[24] This argument relies on the internal aspects of religion—its scriptures and traditions—without 
explaining why these internal traits justify and mandate violence by some groups at sometime and not others. 
In other words, his argument does not include factors external to a religious group and how these factors may 
bear on explaining the variation of peace and violence within religions.
Finally, Mark Sedgwick suggests that religious terrorism is best understood by considering its immediate and 
ultimate objectives. He proposes that “while the ultimate aims will be religiously formulated, the immediate 
objectives will often be found to be almost purely political.”[25] Sedgewick’s observation is useful for realizing 
that religious terrorists’ goals are not purely religious. However, this article will challenge his dichotomy 
between short and long term, and non-religious and religious goals, proposing that certain terrorist can 
have immediate goals that are religious, specifically apocalyptic terrorists, while others can have long-term 
objectives that are political, such as creating a religious government.
Finally, these debates within the literature and lack of consensus on what makes religiously motivated 
terrorism unique from traditional terrorism can be clarified by looking not just at the presence of scripture, 
religious symbols or adherents, but by focusing on uniquely religious goals for which these groups are 
fighting. In other words, the use of scripture or presence of religious symbols is not enough to distinguish a 
group and its use of terrorism as uniquely religious. As previously noted, there are examples of groups that 
use religion as a form of identity or draw from scriptures and symbols to motivate followers, but their goals 
fall within the confines of traditional terrorism. Furthermore, non-religious factors may cause groups to use 
terrorism for religiously salient goals. For example, groups may use terrorism with the aim of overthrowing 
governments that they believe are not upholding the tenets of a particular religion and installing a religious 
government in its place. The cause of the terrorist act is something outside of the faith, but the goal is 
uniquely religious.
Therefore, this article proposes that religiously motivated terrorism can be defined as: the threat or use of 
force with the purpose of influencing or coercing governments and/or populations towards saliently religious 
goals. The discussion below will elaborate on three goals in particular: fomenting the apocalypse, creating a 
religious government, and religiously cleansing a state or area.
Religious Terrorism’s Goals: Apocalypse, Theocracy, and Religious Cleansing
In order to better understand religiously motivated terrorism and distinguish it from its traditional 
counterpart, it is useful to identify specific examples of uniquely religious goals for which groups may be 
striving. This article highlights three goals in particular: fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious 
government, and religiously cleansing a state. These goals are not exhaustive, but do cover the majority of 
religiously motivated violence seen today.
Apocalyptic Terrorism
Some groups have apocalyptic goals; their primary aim is to cause cataclysmic destruction to people, 
property, and the environment with the hope of fomenting the end of time and ushering in religious 
promises of a new world. This pursuit is uniquely religious and is perhaps the most common stereotype of 
religiously motivated terrorism. Apocalyptic terrorism exists both within traditional religions and “cults” or 
New Religious Movements (NRM). For example, Rapoport argues that apocalyptic terrorist groups—what he 
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calls millennialist groups—are inspired by longings for the coming of the messiah, which will coincide with 
the end of the world.[26] Mayer argues that apocalyptic imagining is a cause of terrorism in cults and NRM 
but, by itself, does not usually result in violence. Rather, groups that turn to terrorism are responding to a mix 
of millennialism, real world threats, and internal disputes.[27]
An example of an apocalyptic group within an existing religious tradition is the Gush Emunim in Israel. 
In 1984 members hatched a plot to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock Shrine in Jerusalem, the third 
most holy site in Islam, in order to spark a nuclear and chemical confrontation between Israel and Muslim 
countries. The goal was to create “catastrophic messianism,” disastrous circumstances that would hasten 
the coming of the messiah.[28] The most common example of a NRM group that used terrorism with 
apocalyptic aims is the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which deployed Sarin gas in a Tokyo subway in 1995. 
Its overarching goals was instigating World War III and ultimately “destroying the world to save it.”[29] The 
attacks killed 13 and injured more than 700 people.
Of the three religious goals outlined here, apocalyptic terrorism is the most dangerous for two reasons. First, 
the paradox of ‘destroying the world’—causing catastrophic death and destruction—to create a new and 
better world seems the furthest removed from rational thought and negotiation. This makes counterterrorism 
measures especially difficult; it appears that there is little the U.S. government, or anyone else, can give these 
groups to alter their aims.
Second, the goal of destroying the world is particularly ripe for the use of WMD as a means of achieving 
such ends, which makes apocalyptic groups particularly dangerous. However, it is also important to note that 
many apocalyptic terrorists have turned their violence inward in order to foment the apocalypse, as opposed 
to attacking those outside the group. Some examples of inwardly violent groups include the apocalyptic 
cult The People’s Temple, headed by Jim Jones, in which over 900 members committed suicide en masse in 
anticipation of an apocalyptic standoff with the U.S. government. Another example is Heaven’s Gate, which 
believed that suicide would free the members’ souls.[30] The standoff between U.S. Federal agents and the 
Branch Davidians at the Mount Carmel compound in Waco, Texas, also fulfilled apocalyptic expectations of 
the cult group, and resulted in the death of 76 men, women and children.[31] Mayer notes that examples like 
these, while apocalyptic and violent, may not fall under the definition of terrorism per se, because their goals 
do not extend beyond the confines of their immediate group.[32] Nevertheless, they offer important clues 
about the conditions under which apocalyptic thinking emerges and results in mass violence.
The Creation of a Religious Government
Groups also use terrorism as a means of creating a religious government. This goal is most commonly 
associated with militant Islamic groups and their desire to establish a government run by Shari’a law. For 
example, the Lebanese Twelver Shia organization Hezbollah has used terrorism against the state of Israel and 
against its own government with the ultimate goal of creating a religious government in Lebanon, inspired 
by the theocracy in Iran. Somewhat similarly, the Sunni Palestinian Hamas has used terrorism against Israel 
with the immediate aim of ending its occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and potentially all of Israel, but 
with the ultimate aim of creating a religious government in Palestine.[33]
The desire to create a religious government also exists in other traditions. “Reconstruction Theology” is one 
interpretation of Christian scriptures that calls for the creation of a Christian theocratic government in the 
United States. Reconstruction Theology has inspired groups such as the Christian Identity Movement, which 
is linked to the paramilitary training camp the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). This 
movement aims to use terrorism as a means of compelling change within the U.S. government. Oklahoma 
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City bomber Timothy McVeigh had ties to both Christian Identity and CSA.[34]
Terrorists vying for the creation of a religious government are often confined within a state’s borders, such as 
the Christian Identity Movement in the United States. These groups, however, can also have transnational ties 
and goals through sponsorship from likeminded groups outside their borders and from other states. This is 
true of the Lebanese Hizbollah, which receives financial and material support from the government of Iran, 
which is also Twelver Shia.[35] Transnational ties are also evident in Kach and its successor organizations, 
which receives considerable support from likeminded Jews in the United States.[36] Hamas is also reported 
to receive money from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Iran.[37]
Transnational ties of religious terrorism groups also appear to stem from leaders that have ties to groups 
in other countries. This is true of Kach/JDL, whose leader, Meir Kahane, was born in the United States and 
co-founded the JDL there but then immigrated to Israel and formed Kach, which is made up primarily of 
American-born Jews who have moved to Israel.[38] Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbollah, has personal 
ties to Iran and Iraq, especially through his seminary training in both countries.[39]
In addition to the goal of creating a religious government within a state, there are groups vying to create 
religious regions or super-states. Currently, some groups are working to establish a pan-Islamic entity that 
will transcend state borders. Perhaps the best example of this type of transnational religious terrorism is Al-
Qaeda. Following the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989, Al-Qaeda spread its ideology of jihad through 
leadership ties and training centers to Muslim countries around the globe. After September 11th, bin Laden 
called for the restoration of the Caliphate as a necessary objective to unite and protect the worldwide Muslim 
community.[40] Like-minded groups, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula share these goals. Likewise, groups like Jemiyyah Islamia in Southeast Asia 
have named the creation of a regional Caliphate as one of their stated objectives.[41]
It is worth noting that non-violent pan-Islamic movements exist, which attempt to achieve their ends by 
means other than terrorism. The most notable example is the Muslim Brotherhood, which exists in over 70 
countries, and is strongest in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Although initially a movement that used violence and 
terrorism, the Brotherhood has called for the creation of a pan-Islamic government by the “da’wa”, or calling 
Muslims back to the faith, and through political reform, education and service to Muslims, generally not by 
means of terrorism and violence.[42] Another organization that eschews violence, Hizb ut-Tahrir, has made 
the restoration of the Caliphate one of its stated goals.[43] Both of these groups, despite their official claims to 
non-violence, have been implicated in spreading intolerant ideologies that inspire acts of violence within cells 
or individuals acting on their own. For these reasons, both the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir are 
regarding with caution by countries in which they are active.[44]
The creation of religious governments, through violent or peaceful means, presents important domestic 
and international security concerns to the United States and the international community. The treatment 
of religious minorities and secular groups is a problem under governments that embrace and promote a 
particular interpretation of a religion, and could lead to basic human rights violations and spark internal 
instability. Regionally, the creation of theocracies could prompt refugees to flee an ideology they do not 
espouse. Theocracies could also stir up religious fervor in like-minded religious adherents beyond its borders, 
causing regional instability. The creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 is a case-in-point for both 
domestic and international security concerns sparked by the creation of a religious government. Iran’s 
theocracy has been notoriously intolerant towards religious minorities, particularly the Baha’i, as well as to 
secular opposition groups. Regionally, Iran has caused instability by spreading religious fervour to countries 
with Shia populations, especially Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon, in addition to an all-out war with 
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Iraq from 1980 to 1988.
Lastly, it is useful to note that groups agitating for the creation of a religious government often disagree 
among themselves as to the nature and scope of religion’s involvement in the state. For example, religious 
political parties exist in countries ranging from Israel (Jewish) to India (Hindu) to Pakistan (Islamic and 
Christian) to Sri Lanka (Buddhist), but within each of these countries, there is a wide variance of opinions on 
how a religious state should work. Sri Lanka presents an interesting example. In 1956, the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) ran on a platform that promised to give Buddhism a preferential place in the country, along 
with other allowances to the Sinhalese majority, which is primarily Buddhist. When the government failed 
to deliver on these promises, a Buddhist Monk assassinated the prime minster in 1959. Buddhist discontent 
later led to the creation of a Buddhist revolutionary movement that used terrorism to agitate for a Buddhist 
theocracy in Sri Lanka.[45] Somewhat similarly, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin was assassinated in 
1995 by the Israeli Yigal Amir because he believed that Rabin was compromising the true integrity of the 
Jewish state by negotiating with the Palestinians.[46] Therefore, efforts aimed at creating a religious state are 
destabilizing because they throw into question what the state should look like and who speaks for the 
religion.
Terrorism and Religious Cleansing
Religious terrorists also aim to eradicate “infidels”—the unfaithful within their tradition or in other 
religions—in order to create a religiously pure state.[47] This goal differs from the creation of a religious 
government in that groups aim to make all the citizens within a state’s border or region conform to their 
interpretation of the faith; it is religious cleansing, which includes battles with other religious groups as well 
as those within a religion whose interpretation of the faith differs from the group’s.
Religious cleansing can be expressed in specific terms, such as the eradication of another group, or in broad 
terms, such as the cleansing of a culture, ideas or norms that do not conform to the group’s worldviews. For 
example, Jewish settlers associated with the JDL/Kach movement in the West Bank, particularly in Hebron, 
have named as one of their goals the expulsion of non-Jews from land that they believe is divinely theirs.
[48] This is a battle against other religions. In addition, however, the movement is battling Jews who do 
not conform to their interpretation of the faith along with the Israeli government, which it believes is not 
upholding the tenets of the faith. Rabbi Meir Kahane, the co-founder of the JDL and the founder of Kach 
stated in an interview in the 1980s that it is the requirement of Israel, as a Jewish state, to create a government 
based on the Torah, and that those who do not see this, are not truly Jewish. “A Jewish state means that, at a 
minimum, there must be a majority of Jews; a Jewish sovereignty with the power to make our own laws…My 
hope as a religious Jew, which is the hope of every sincere and religious Jew, is to have a state governed by the 
Torah.”[49] As previously noted, Kahane and his organisations inspired violent actions aimed at achieving 
these goals, including assassination, murder, and attempted destruction of religious sites.
Terrorism aimed at religious cleansing appears similar to non-religious terrorism aimed at ethnic cleansing. 
However, religious cleansing is different for the important reason that religion, not ethnicity, is the salient 
defining characteristic of both the terrorist group and the target. This means that religious terrorist 
groups can be multi-ethnic, such as Al-Qaeda, which is made up of Muslims from all over the worldwide 
community, but not multi-religious; they are all Muslim. Furthermore, terrorism aimed at religious cleansing 
may also look like religious fratricide, where violence is intra-religious. In these cases, groups use terrorism 
to rid an area or country of co-religionists that they believe are corrupting or not upholding the true tenets of 
the faith. In both cases, the salient characteristic between these groups is faith, not differing ethnicities. Table 
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1.2 summarises the goals of religious terrorism.
Table 1.2 Religious Terrorism
Defining Goals Examples
Apocalyptic §	Cataclysmic destruction to people, 
property, environment
§	Hasten arrival of a “new world”
§	Aum Shinrikyo
§	Elements of JDL/Kach






§	Create a state governed by religious 
law and doctrine









§	Remove groups from other religions
§	Remove groups within same religion 




Leadership and Targets of Religious Terrorists
In addition to the goals for which groups are fighting, religious terrorism has additional attributes that 
distinguish it from its traditional counterparts, including unique sources of leadership and some of its targets. 
A common perception is that religious groups that use terrorism are led by a cleric, or a similar religious 
leader, such as an imam, ‘alim, rabbi, or swami. However, not all leaders of terrorist groups have such bona 
fide leaders; rather the origin of the religious leader’s authority comes from several key sources. For example, 
religious authority can be self-appointed, such as Shoko Asahara, the spiritual leader and founder of Aum 
Shinrikyo.[50] Religious authorities can also be charismatic figures from outside the clergy of a traditional 
religion, such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, the key leaders of Al-Qaeda.[51] Religious 
authorities within terrorist groups can also be individuals who are trained as religious clerics or scholars. 
Examples of this type of authority are Sheikh Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Hizbollah, who 
was trained as a Shia cleric in Najaf, Iraq, and Qum, Iran, and Meir Kahane of the JDL and Kach, who was 
trained as a Rabbi in the United States.
These different types of leadership in religiously motivated terrorism may seem puzzling at a glance, but 
they emphasise that religious power has more than one source and its legitimacy resides with the followers. 
In the case of bin Laden, his influence was derived from a combination of charisma and admiration for 
his purported success as a warrior in the Afghan-Soviet war and with various terrorist operations. With 
others, such as Nasrallah and Kahane, it was religious training. Still, with some it is self-proclaimed divine 
connections, as will Asahara and Koresh. Nevertheless, despite the source of their religious authority, the 
presence of a religious leader who is recognised as legitimate and who is given the authority to speak on 
behalf of the faith by his or her followers is typical to most religious terrorist movements. Religious authority, 
in other words, rests with group’s followers.
Similarly, religious terrorists have an array of different targets, which reveals important clues about their 
goals. Broadly speaking, religious terrorists tend to have two types of targets: tactical targets that serve 
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specific, earthly goals and are no different from other forms of terrorism; and symbolic targets.
Tactical targets are means to a bigger, earthly campaign. For example, terrorists seeking to create a religious 
government target the workings of the state, including attacks on heads of state and government officials. 
Examples of these types of targets include the Egyptian Gamaat’s assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 
and Yigal Amir’s assassination of Yitzak Rabin in 1994.[52] These types of attacks also include targeting a 
government’s infrastructure and sources of power, such as the attack on the Alfred P. Murrah building in 
Oklahoma in 1995, believed to be inspired in part by the Christian Identity Movement.[53]
Religious terrorists also target the presence of foreign governments within their borders or region, including 
military forces, such as Israeli soldiers in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. Palestinian Islamic 
militants have targeted Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as part of their aim of liberating the land from foreign 
occupiers. Likewise, the Lebanese Hizbollah targeted IDF soldiers occupying southern Lebanon with the 
aim of their expulsion.[54] Religious terrorists also targeted U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden named 
the presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil, the home of Islam’s holiest cities, as threatening and humiliating to 
Islam. In 1996 and again in1998, he declared that attacks against “Satan’s U.S. troops” were necessary for the 
protection of Muslims and for cleansing infidel forces “out of all the lands of Islam.”[55] Another example of 
these targets is religious terrorist groups who have attacked foreign embassies, including Egyptian Islamic 
extremists’ bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan in 1995 and Al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
In addition to specific domestic targets, religious terrorists often have targets that extend beyond the borders 
of the state in which they reside. Religious terrorists have targeted third party states that support domestic 
regimes. For example, radical Islamic militants in Egypt named the United States as one of its targets for its 
support of Sadat’s and Mubarak’s regimes, which they saw as oppressive and un-Islamic.[56] Likewise, Islamic 
militants in Pakistan have named the United States as a target for its support of the Pakistani regime, which is 
mainly secular in its outlook and goals.[57]
These tactical targets look no different than secular, Marxist, anarchist or ethnic-separatist terrorists bent 
on political change or revolution.[58] For example, Anti-U.S. sentiment is strong within the non-religious 
Colombian FARC terrorist group, particularly for U.S. aid to the current Columbian government.[59] This 
sentiment could potentially translate into attacks on U.S. civilians and property.[60] Likewise, British troops 
in Northern Ireland have been the target of republican terrorist groups with the end-goal of expelling these 
forces and reuniting Northern Ireland with the Republic, which is not a uniquely religious goal.[61] What 
makes terrorism towards these targets ultimately religious is that they are stepping-stones to greater religious 
goals—the creation of a religious government.[62]
In addition to tactical targets aimed at changing regimes or compelling the withdrawal of foreign influences, 
religious groups also use terrorist tactics to attack individuals and groups that they believe are threatening 
their interpretation of the faith. For example, religious terrorists target citizens and property that represent 
the religious “other.” Examples include attacks on Christian churches in Indonesia in December of 2000, 
believed to be the work of Islamic terrorists in the region, and more recent attacks on Christians in 
Pakistan.[63] Other examples include the Indian Hindu militant group Shiv Sena, which aims to promote 
Maharashtria Hindus in Mumbai and drive Muslims from India. Bal Thackeray, Shiv Sena’s founder, called 
for the creation of Hindu suicide bombers to target Muslims in 2002 and 2008.[64] Religious terrorists can 
also target other groups’ religious sites. Examples include the above-mentioned church bombings, and the 
plot by Jewish extremists in Israel to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock shrine in Jerusalem. These 
targets tend to be unique to religious terrorists and support the aim of cleansing the land of the religious 
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“other.”
These types of attacks also include intra-religious attacks on those believe to be apostates within the faith. An 
example of this type of targeting is takfir violence in Islam, where militant groups draw from religious sources 
to justify killing Muslims that they believe are not upholding the true practice of the faith. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
for example, has attacked Iraqi Shia, claiming that they are apostates to Islam.[65] These attacks look similar 
to ethnic-separatist attacks on minorities in regions they believe to be their own, but are unique in that the 
targets are focused on cleansing an area of perceived religious impurities.
Religious terrorists also have symbolic targets, which mostly operate on an abstract level and tend to be 
specific to religious goals and objectives. Most notably, religious terrorists can attempt to attack “culture,” 
values and norms that do not conform to the religious ideals of the terrorist group. Examples of this include 
attacks on movie theaters, discos, bars and other social gathering points. For example, Muslim extremists 
set fire to a hotel in Turkey in 1993, targeting “leftist writers and intellectuals,” killing over 40 people.[66] 
Warring fundamentalist groups in Algeria violently suppressed Rai music in the 1990s for its mix of Western 
and Mediterranean styles, including attacking and then eventually exiling the singer Khaled.[67] In India, 
Hindu militants have destroyed numerous paintings of Muslim artist Maqbool Fida Husain, particularly 
works depicting Hindu deities.[68] In the United States, Christian Identity activists bombed a lesbian bar, 
targeting what they perceive as symbols of the secular, immoral state.[69]
These targets are abstract because the definition of culture is largely amorphous; it is difficult if not impossible 
to find the source of culture and remove it fully. Therefore, unlike the state, the source of culture cannot be 
targeted specifically and abstract targets become the only real choice. Abstract targets, however, require a 
certain degree of decoding by counterterrorism forces and often the meaning and significance behind certain 
attacks may be missed.
Finally, apocalyptic groups aim to maximize violence and mass casualties; the goal is chaos with the hope of 
ushering in a new era, either in this world or the next. Aum Shinrikyo, for example, sought total destruction, 
which knows no bounds between domestic and international and names no specific targets. For groups 
such as these, the end-goal, at least on an earthly plane, is mass violence and destruction. The cataclysmic 
nature of apocalyptic terrorism is an additional reason why this specific type of religious terrorists needs 
to be considered as a distinct and unique category. Its use of violence to achieve transcendent goals is 
different from other forms of religious terrorism with more limited goals.[70] Table 1.3 summarizes religious 
terrorisms domestic and international targets.
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Table 1.3 Religious Terrorism’s Targets
Specific Targets Abstract Targets
Domestic §	Workings of the state—
assassinate leaders, attacks 
on infrastructure, undermine 
authority of state
§	Attacks on secular art and other 
cultural institutions
§	Attacks on secular intellectuals
§	Attacks on historic, other 
religious sites/artifacts




§	“Secular” or “Western” culture
§	Globalization
Conclusion
This article has argued that religious terrorism has characteristics that make it uniquely different from 
traditional secular left-wing and right-wing terrorism, specifically in the goals for which religious terrorists 
are striving. Three salient religious goals were presented: the apocalyptic aim of destroying the world, 
the creation of a religious government, and the creation of a religiously pure state. Of these three goals, 
apocalyptic actions aimed at ‘destroying the world to save it’ are the most threatening because they suggest 
the use of WMD with mass casualties and damage to property. In addition to goals, religious terrorism is also 
differentiated by the presence of religious leaders, which do not derive their authority from one source, but 
rather are given legitimacy by their followers. Finally, religious terrorists tend to have two types of targets, 
specific and abstract. Specific, tactical targets include the state or adversarial groups; as such, they look 
similar to targets of left and right wing terrorists. However, religious terrorists also have symbolic targets that 
represent secular or other religious cultures and values, both within states and internationally targets that are 
unique. Apocalyptic terrorists make no distinction between domestic and international, specific and abstract. 
Instead, they are concerned with the one pursuit of cataclysmic destruction.
These arguments suggest several counterterrorism measures aimed at mitigating or eradicating terrorism 
performed in the name of religion. All of these courses of action require a basic understanding of the group, 
its leadership, and the goals for which the group is fighting. Furthermore, none of these types of religiously 
motivated terrorism can be countered by the use of force alone.
First, apocalyptic terrorism presents unique counterterrorism challenges. Groups that believe that 
causing mass casualties and chaos will hasten the end of times are operating on a rationale that does not 
conform to earthly logic. Their acute worldview and goals suggest that they are not open to negotiation or 
compromise. With this in mind, a strategy of containment combined with targeting leadership is the best 
path to undermining these groups. Specifically, counterterrorism strategies should first focus on preventing 
the spread of the group’s apocalyptic worldview. An important means to this end is to avoid fulfilling the 
group’s prophecies. If the group is anticipating persecution or a fiery confrontation with the alleged ‘forces 
of evil’, a state’s excessive use of force could make this dream come true. Rather than targeting the group, 
a better counterterrorism approach would be to understand the role that leadership plays in generating 
the apocalyptic worldview and, if the group is driven by one or a few key leaders, target those individuals. 
Research and empirical examples suggest that apocalyptic groups are highly leadership driven, especially in 
New Religious Movements; therefore targeting the leaders may cause the group to fall apart.[71] The goal 
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with this approach is to change the group’s worldview by taking out its propagator or, at a minimum, render 
the group unable to carry out its apocalyptic dreams.
Groups that use terrorism with the goal of creating a religious government have several counterterrorism 
options. As previously described, groups vying for the creation of a theocracy often disagree on how the state 
should look and who should speak for the faith. These fissures offer important opportunities for creating in-
fighting within and amongst groups and weakening the overall movement. In particular, if governments can 
help foster a culture of debate and create public opportunities for airing groups’ plans for creating a religious 
government, these disagreements could build. The overall goal with this strategy is to cause the movement 
to implode. Using force against these groups and their leaders may be counterproductive, especially if the 
groups have a base of support, active or passive, and the population is not supportive of the state. In these 
cases, force would most likely validate the group’s criticisms of the state and could possibly turn popular 
support in the group’s favour.
Groups that use terrorism bent on religiously cleansing an area within a state are best countered by treating 
these groups as criminals and by using law enforcement to monitor and punish their actions. This approach 
serves two important counterterrorism functions. First, treating these groups and their acts as criminal 
and illegitimate undermines their ideology and authority. Second, using law enforcement, as opposed to 
greater, more kinetic approaches, minimises national and international exposure of the group and makes 
them appear like any other criminal group, as opposed to a world-changing religious movement. In other 
words, deploying greater force against these groups could send a message that they are a big threat and raise 
awareness of their cause and seeming success. The goal, rather, is to minimise the group’s publicity and de-
legitimate their actions. The challenge with this approach is that states may not have the law enforcement 
capacity to monitor, arrest, and prevent these groups from taking action. Anti-Christian terrorism in Nigeria 
is a case-in-point.
Within these three types of religious terrorism, paying attention to leadership is critical. As argued, religious 
groups that use terrorism have leaders that are recognised as legitimate by their followers, but do not 
necessarily possess bona fide qualities such as religious education or clerical training. A useful path for 
undermining these religious leaders is through other religious leaders that also have legitimacy. For example, 
beginning in 2002, key leadership of the Egyptian Gamaat have written treaties and spoken out against Al-
Qaeda’s leadership and interpretations of Islam, especially Jihad.[72] One of the leaders of Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad, Dr. Fadl, followed suit in 2008 with his own denunciation of Al-Qaeda’s ideology.[73] These debates 
suggest that scriptures, beliefs and tenets are open to debate and that no single leader can corner the market 
on truth.
Finally, it is important for counterterrorism forces to pay attention to what religious terrorists attack, because 
these targets offer important clues for the groups’ goals, which in turn affect the type of countermeasures 
employed. Groups that are focused on state targets are more likely to be vying for political control, whereas 
targeting other groups within the faith or other religions suggest a goal of religious cleansing. Mass casualties 
and damage that seem indiscriminate, illogical and excessive suggest apocalyptic aims.
Just as there is more than one type of religious terrorism, there is more than one countermeasure to 
undermine a group’s goals. Better understanding of such groups, their leadership and goals, will allow for a 
more nuanced approach and, hopefully, lead to greater success in undermining their message and their use of 
terrorism in the name of religion.
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